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I. INTRODUCTION
In criminal procedure, notice-of-alibi rules require the defense to
identify to the prosecution, in advance of trial, any witnesses whose
testimony will be used to establish an alibi defense.' Notice-of-alibi
rules were approved by the United States Supreme Court in Wil-
liams v. Florida,2 over challenges based on due process and the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The rationale sup-
porting such notice rules is, simply stated, that surprise alibi wit-
nesses are of dubious credibility.3 The Florida rule upheld in Wil-
liams provided a preclusion sanction for noncompliance.4 Noting
that such a sanction posed sixth amendment issues, the Court never-
1. See generally Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Requiring
Defendant in Criminal Case to Disclose Matter as to Alibi Defense, 45 A.L.R. 3d 958,
§§ 1,3 (1972).
2. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
3. The Supreme Court stated in Williams that "[g]iven the ease with which an
alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh hour
defense is both obvious and legitimate." Id. at 81. The Court went on to write that the
rules are "designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both
the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the
determination of guilt or innocence." Id. at 82. Alibi had been called the "hip pocket"
defense. Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. CRaM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
29, 31 (1964).
4. "If a defendant fails to file . . . notice . . . the court may exclude evidence
offered by such defendant for the purpose of providing an alibi, except the testimony of
the defendant himself." FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.200 (West 1975)(formerly codified at FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 1.200).
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theless expressly declined to consider them. 5 Inasmuch as the preclu-
sion sanction was not applied in Williams, there was "no occasion to
explore"6 the sixth amendment questions.
Eighteen years after Williams, the Court found an "occasion to
explore" the constitutionality of preclusion sanctions. In Taylor v.
Illinois,7 the Court reviewed the Illinois rule that permits a trial
judge to preclude a criminal defense witness if the defense fails to
identify the witness in response to a pre-trial discovery motion by the
prosecution.'
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of five,9 framed the ques-
tion as whether preclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for non-
compliance with a discovery rule "violated the petitioner's constitu-
tional right to obtain the testimony of favorable witnesses." 10 The
five justices held that preclusion of defense witnesses for discovery
violations "is not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and [found] no constitutional error
5. In Williams, the Court noted:
We emphasize that this case does not involve the question of the validity of the
threatened sanction, had petitioner chosen not to comply with the notice-of-
alibi rule. Whether and to what extent a State can enforce discovery rules
against a defendant who fails to comply, by excluding relevant, probative evi-
dence is a question raising Sixth Amendment issues which we have no occasion
to explore.
399 U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970).
6. Id. The defendant made a pre-trial motion to be exempted from the rule.
The motion was denied, so the defendant named his alibi witness. On appeal, the rule
and the preclusion sanction were challenged. Id. at 80-81.
The Court also declined to explore the same sixth amendment issues in Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), in which Oregon's notice-of-alibi statue was deemed an
unconstitutional abridgement of due process because it made no provision for reciprocal
discovery by defendants of the State's alibi rebuttal witnesses. Wardius argued that even
if such one-way discovery were valid, to enforce it with a preclusion sanction would be
unconstitutional. The Court again left the question open: "[lin light of our holding that
Oregon's rule is facially invalid, we express no view as to whether a valid rule could be so
enforced." Id. at 472 n.4.
7. 108 S. Ct. 646, reh'g denied 108 S. Ct. 1283 (1988).
8. The Illinois rule is at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I IA, 415 (g)(i)(Smith-Hurd
1985). See also, 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.4(f) (1984)("ap-
proximately fifteen states ...require the defendant to disclose before trial the names
and addresses of those persons he expects to call as defense witnesses"); Blumenson,
Constitutional Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 123,
123 n.1 (1983) (listing thirty-six jurisdictions with some provision for prosecutorial dis-
covery). Blumenson highlights the need for the Court to consider the constitutionality of
preclusion sanctions with an observation that such sanctions "vastly exceed the scope of
the only prosecutorial discovery order ever approved by the Supreme Court ...[i.e.,]
...Williams v. Florida." Id. at 124. There is no pre-trial prosecutorial discovery in
California criminal cases. See Tomlinson, Constitutional Limitations on Prosecutorial
Discovery, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993, 1020-22 (1986).
9. Joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ. The dissent
by Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. At the time, the
Court had only eight members because the vacancy left by Justice Powell had not been
filled.
10. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 648-49.
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on the specific facts of this case."11
II. BACKGROUND
The Compulsory Process Clause guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."1 2 The modern view
of compulsory process originated in Washington v. Texas, 3 three
years before Williams. In Washington, the Supreme Court unani-
mously invalidated a Texas rule that barred persons charged as co-
participants in the same crime from testifying for one another. The
rule could not be defended on the ground that it excluded the testi-
mony of persons likely to commit perjury because the rule permitted
an accused accomplice to testify for the prosecution, and "common
sense"' 4 indicated that a codefendant, especially one awaiting trial
or sentencing, would be more likely to lie in favor of the prosecution.
A key passage both interpreted the Compulsory Process Clause and
applied it to the states by incorporation into fourteenth amendment
due process:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attend-
ance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right
to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to
the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the
right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging
their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a
defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law."5
The Court could see no difference between a hypothetical rule
barring all defense witnesses and "arbitrary rules that prevent whole
categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a pri-
ori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.' 1 6 Such rules
did not comport with compulsory process because "[t]he Framers
• . . did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant
the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he
had no right to use.'. 7
11. Id. at 649.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id. at 19. For the historic interpretations of the Compulsory Process Clause,
see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 71 (1974); Bradley,
Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the Defendant's Right to Testify, 18 AM. CRIm. L.
REV. 419 (1981).
16. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
17. Id. at 23.
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An important corollary to Washington is Chambers v. Missis-
sippi,18 in which the Supreme Court, by an 8-1 decision, reversed a
murder conviction because of constitutional error in evidentiary rul-
ings. The trial judge had excluded exculpatory testimony as hearsay,
even though the hearsay declarant was in the courtroom and under
oath. Also, the defendant was not allowed to call the hearsay declar-
ant as an adverse witness subject to cross-examination. The Court
concluded that these evidentiary rulings deprived the accused of "a
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due
process."' 9 Although the holding was based solely on due process,
the Court cited Washington for the statement that "[flew rights are
more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his
own defense."2
Chambers is important in the present context because the Court
recognized that the right to present a defense, although certainly es-
sential to a fair trial, is not unlimited. The Court wrote that "[iun
the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State,
must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment
of guilt and innocence."21 Thus, that dictum from Chambers adum-
brates the holding in Taylor.
The teaching of Washington and Chambers was reaffirmed in a
1987 case, Rock v. Arkansas.2" Relying heavily on those two cases, a
5-4 Court invalidated an Arkansas Supreme Court ruling that
barred all hypnotically refreshed testimony. Reasoning from Wash-
ington, the Court concluded that per se exclusion of such testimony
"infringes impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his
or her own behalf.12 3 The Court acknowledged the Chambers idea
that the right to present a defense is not unlimited, and synthesized
Washington and Chambers by writing that "restrictions of a defend-
ant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve."2 4
Rock is distinguishable from Taylor. Rock concerned the defend-
ant's right to testify, where Taylor concerned the defendant's right
to the testimony of favorable witnesses. Nevertheless, Rock is impor-
tant for at least two reasons: (1) the alignment of the votes in the
two cases reveals that the author of Taylor, Justice Stevens, cast the
decisive vote; and (2) the dissent in Taylor relies heavily on Rock,
18. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
19. Id. at 302.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
23. Id. at 2714-15.
24. Id. at 2711.
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whereas the majority opinion omits it completely.
As noted above, the Supreme Court twice expressly refused to ad-
dress the witness preclusion issue.25 Moreover, the Court has de-
clined to review other cases raising the issue. 6 In the eighteen years
that the Court left open the question of the preclusion sanction's
constitutionality, the lower courts considered the question and
worked out the law for themselves. Some of the lower courts have
adopted an ad hoc balancing approach. Other courts consider the
preclusion sanction to be within the realm of trial court discretion
and appellate review is conducted in those terms.2 8 Only two courts
have held that compulsory process absolutely bars the preclusion
sanction.2 9
Defense witness preclusion has been persuasively criticized on
both constitutional and utilitarian grounds."0 Also, exercise of the
25. See supra notes 5-6.
26. The Court has recently denied certiorari at least four times on this issue. See
Lane v. Enoch, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986); United States ex rel. Robinson v. McGinnis, 593
F. Supp. 175 (C.D. II1. 1984), affd, 753 F.2d 1078, cert. denied 471 U.S. 1116 (1985);
Smith v. Jago, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948 (1983).
27. See, e.g., Fendler v. Goldsmith 728 F.2d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1983);
Braunskill v. Hilton, 629 F. Supp. 511, 522-23 (D.N.J.), afJd, 808 F.2d 1515 (3d Cir.
1986); Robinson, 593 F. Supp. at 181-83; State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 252, 599 P.2d
199, 208 (1979); State v. Francis, 128 N.J. Super. 346, 351, 320 A.2d 173, 176 (1974);
State v. Mai, 294 Or. 269, 280, 656 P.2d 315, 320-21 (1982).
28. See, e.g., People v. Rayford, 43 Ill. App. 3d 283, 356 N.E.2d 1274 (1976);
State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); Ray v. State, 262 So.2d 475
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
29. See United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he com-
pulsory process clause of the sixth amendment forbids the exclusion of otherwise admissi-
ble evidence solely as a sanction to enforce discovery rules or orders against criminal
defendants."); United States ex rel. Veal v. Wolff, 529 F. Supp. 713, 722 (N.D. I11.
1981) (same).
30. The constitutional argument against the preclusion sanction is that it lies
outside the modern view of the Compulsory Process Clause as "the right to present a
defense." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). The disutility argument is that
preclusion "undercuts the very purpose of the [notice] rule . . . . Excluding the ac-
cused's evidence regarding an affirmative defense is a peculiarly ironic and inappropriate
way to further 'the search for truth.'" Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 836 (1976).
A persuasive argument against the preclusion sanction is at Note, The Preclusion Sanc-
tion - A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342
(1972). See also 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, ch. 11, § 4.7(a) (commentary at
11.67-68)(2d ed. 1980) ("The exclusion sanction is not recommended because its results
are capricious. Thus, exclusion of prosecution evidence may produce a disproportionate
windfall for the defendant, while exclusion of defense evidence may lead to an unfair
conviction. Either result would defeat the objectives of discovery. In addition, the exclu-
sion of defense raises significant constitutional issues.").
Several states have adopted verbatim the ABA Standards. Thus preclusion is not ex-
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preclusion sanction can yield harsh results.31 Nevertheless, preclu-
sion has been accepted in many lower courts. 2 In those courts, the
cases reveal some troublesome constitutional questions.
First, methods other than preclusion usually are available for deal-
ing with the credibility problem of undisclosed witnesses. For exam-
ple, when a surprise witness appears during trial, the court could
grant a continuance for the prosecution to investigate the witness
and prepare rebuttal testimony, or the court could allow the testi-
mony subject to comment by the prosecutor on the fact of a discov-
ery violation and its implications relative to the witness's credibility.
The possibility of alternative sanctions3 3 leads to an argument that
compulsory process requires a "less drastic means" test before exer-
cise of the preclusion sanction.34 Another vexing question is whether
compulsory process prohibits the preclusion sanction where the ac-
cused is blameless for the discovery rule violation.35
Taylor is an important case in constitutional law and criminal
procedure. In holding that compulsory process does not absolutely
bar the preclusion sanction, the Court has taken a major step in de-
pressly authorized. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.03(8); WASH. CRIM. R. 4.7(h)(7)(i). In
those states, the rules follow the ABA language that authorizes a trial judge to enter an
order that is "just, under the circumstances." See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d
368 (Minn. 1979) (allowing preclusion); Contra State v. Thacker, 94 Wash.2d 276, 616
P.2d 655 (1980).
31. In Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 948
(1983), the accused did not want to testify because he would have been subject to im-
peachment as a result of a prior criminal record. The defense was an alibi, but the wit-
ness was excluded, even though the prosecutor did not object to a continuance. Thus, the
defendant was deprived of any meaningful defense because of a procedural default.
32. See generally Annotation, Sanctions Against Defense In Criminal Case For
Failure to Comply With Discovery Requirements, 9 A.L.R. 4th 837, § 5 (1981) (collect-
ing cases "where the defendants had failed to comply . . . with general discovery re-
quirements to disclose the identity of defense witnesses to the prosecution.").
33. Continuance is referred to as a sanction for convenience. It arguably is not a
sanction because if a surprise witness "pops-up" just as the prosecution rests, the delay
can benefit the defense, as the prosecution's evidence fades in the jury's memory. See
Epstein, supra note 3, at 36.
34. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 252, 599 P.2d 199, 208 (1979)
("Prohibiting the calling of a witness should be invoked only in those cases where other
less stringent sanctions are not applicable to effect the ends of justice."); State v. Mai,
294 Or. 269, 280, 656 P.2d 315, 321 (1982) (preclusion is unconstitutional absent
prejudice to prosecution and only if other sanctions are unavailing). Contra State v. Rob-
erts, 226 Kan. 740, 602 P.2d 1355 (1979); People v. Jackson, 71 Mich. App. 395, 249
N.W.2d 132 (1976). The language of the Kansas and Michigan statutes makes preclu-
sion of undisclosed alibi witnesses mandatory. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3218(4)
(1981); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21(1) (West 1982).
35. See, e.g., Robbins v. Cardwell, 618 F.2d 581, 583 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980)(ques-
tioning whether defendant could be subject to sanctions absent a showing that she had
been informed of discovery rules and sanctions); Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329,
1336 (D.N.J. 1980) ("The testimony of a defense witness may not be precluded because
of defense counsel's failure to comply with court rules, unless the record reveals some
complicity on the part of the defendant."). Contra State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.
129, 140, 163 N.W.2d 177, 182 (1968).
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lineating the contours of the sixth amendment. Also, the Court
clearly reveals that it is immaterial whether the defendant had any
personal involvement in the notice rule violation. 36
However, Taylor has substantial shortcomings. On the question of
the necessity of less drastic means, the Court's answer is unclear.
Moreover, holding that compulsory process does not absolutely bar
the preclusion sanction implies that under some circumstances com-
pulsory process does bar the preclusion sanction, which necessitates
adopting a balancing test. The Court purports to adopt a test, but its
formula is cast in such vague terms that it cannot be of much help in
resolving hard cases.37 In addition, the Court sends a contradictory
message: despite the harshness of its dicta toward discovery viola-
tors, the Court signals as an example of the balancing approach
Fendler v. Goldsmith,38 a case in which willfulness of the violation is
subordinate to the importance of the excluded witness's testimony in
the court's balancing. By undercutting its harsh dicta with Fendler,
the Court appears to limit its analysis to the particular facts in Tay-
lor. Therefore, Taylor may have little impact on the law.
A. The Illinois Court
Illinois Practice Rules provide for reciprocal discovery in all crimi-
nal cases in which conviction is "punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary." 39 Both the state and defense must disclose, upon mo-
tion by the other, the names and addresses of all witnesses they in-
tend to call.40 Rule 415 authorizes the trial judge to deal with non-
compliance by ordering the noncompliant party to disclose the
withheld information; by granting a continuance; by excluding the
undisclosed evidence; or by entering whatever order the judge
"deems just under the circumstances.""' In addition, willful violation
of the discovery rules or pursuant orders may subject the offending
36. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 656-57.
37. See infra text accompanying note 76.
38. 728 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1983).
39. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 411 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
40. Rule 412 requires the State, upon written motion by the defense, to disclose
the "names and last known addresses of persons whom the State intends to call as wit-
nesses, together with their relevant written or recorded statements... ." Id. at para.
412(a)(i). Rule 413 requires the defense to reciprocate; upon written motion by the
State, defense counsel must disclose the "names and last know addresses of persons he
intends to call as witnesses together with their relevant written or recorded statements
." Id. para. 413(d)(i).
41. Id. at para. 415(g)(i).
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counsel to "appropriate sanctions by the court." '42
Ray Taylor was convicted of attempted murder in 1984, for the
shooting of Jack Bridges during a street fight on Chicago's south
side on August 6, 1981."1 Taylor was sentenced to ten years impris-
onment. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Illi-
nois in 1986.44
The incident began after Bridges slapped Derrick Travis for sit-
ting on Bridges' car. Taylor intervened on Travis' behalf.45 Tempers
flared, and a twenty-minute argument ensued. Bridges left the scene
in order "to cool off." 46 Apparently, tempers did not cool enough,
because a violent encounter arose when Bridges returned, about an
hour later.47
At trial, Bridges testified that he and his brother, Maurice Beth-
any, were accosted by a group consisting of Taylor, Travis, and sev-
eral others. Bridges testified that he fled, but Taylor chased him and
when about four feet away fired four shots, the last of which struck
him in the back. Bridges also testified that, as he lay in the street,
Taylor pointed the gun at his head and pulled the trigger, but the
gun misfired.48
Two sisters, Hattie and Regina Algood, both friends of Taylor's,
testified for the defense. They claimed that the gun was in the hands
of Bridges' brother Bethany, who fired into the crowd, hitting his
own brother by mistake.49
Twenty-two months after the melee, Taylor was indicted on a
charge of attempted murder.50 On the second day of trial, defense
counsel requested leave to add the names of Alfred Wormley and
42. Id. at para. 415(g)(ii).
43. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 649.






50. Id. The delay in indictment was the basis for a pre-trial motion to dismiss, in
which Taylor claimed that the delay violated due process because it "made it impossible
. . . to reconstruct his activities on the date in question and prepare his defense." Id. at
843, 491 N.E. 2d at 5 (1986). The motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed on
appeal because:
Despite the requirement of a clear showing of substantial prejudice, the de-
fendant here failed to present any evidence of actual prejudice. Defense counsel
stated that he was unable to locate witnesses because they had moved from
burned-out buildings. Counsel did not identify the witnesses or ibake any show-
ing that their testimony would be helpful . . . . Counsel did state that from a
list of 20 potential witnesses, he had spoken to 10. The defendant has demon-
strated only a possibility of prejudice. That is not enough to shift the burden to
the State to show the reasonableness or necessity for the delay.
Id. at 844, 491 N.E.2d at 6.
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Pam Berkhalter to the defense witness list.51 By that time, the prose-
cution's two principal witnesses had already testified.52
The trial judge then asked defense counsel why Taylor had not
previously mentioned these two witnesses. Counsel replied that Tay-
lor had informed him about Wormley, but that Taylor had not been
able to locate Wormley.53 The trial judge, after expressing his con-
cern about the credibility of eleventh-hour witnesses, directed coun-
sel to bring the additional witnesses to court the next day, at which
time he would decide whether to allow them to testify.5
The next day, Wormley's testimony was presented as an offer of
proof outside the presence of the jury. Wormley testified that he had
not seen the fight, but that he had seen Bridges and Bethany with
two guns prior to the shooting. Wormley also testified that he "hap-
pened to run into Ray and them" 55 and warned them about the guns.
51. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 649-50. The dialogue is reported:
During the direct testimony of the witness, your Honor, called by the State, I
was informed of some additional witnesses which could have, and probably did,
in fact, see this entire incident. We at this time would ask to amend our An-
swer to include two additional witnesses.
THE COURT: Who are they?
MR. VAN: One is a guy named Alfred Wrdely of which -
THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me. W-r-d-e-l-y.
MR. VAN: Whose address I do not have. I'm going to have to see if I can
locate him tonight. And Pam Berkhalter.
Id. at 649 n.4.
52. Id. at 649.
53. Id. at 650. The trial judge complained:
THE COURT: Yeah, but the defendant was there, and the defendant is now
telling you Pam Berkhalter, and he's now telling you Alfred Wrdely. Why
didn't he tell you that some time ago? He's got an obligation to tell you.
MR. VAN: That is correct, Judge. He, in fact, told me about Alfred some time
ago. The problem was that he could not locate Alfred.
Id. at 650, n.5.
54. Id. at 650. The judge commented:
There's all sorts of people on the scene, and all of these people should have
been disclosed before. When you bring up these witnesses at the very last mo-
ment, there's always the allegation and the thought process that witnesses are
being found that really weren't there. And it's a problem in these type of cases,
and it should be - should have been put on that sheet a long time ago. At any
rate, I'll worry about it tomorrow.
Id. at 650 n.6.
55. Id. at 650. Wormley's voir dire testimony included the following:
Q. What, if anything, did you learn by standing there in the crowd?
A. Well, Jack [Bridges] had a blanket. It was two pistols in there and he gave
it to -
Q. And then what, if anything, did they say at that time, if you can recall?
A. Well, they were saying what they were going to do to the people. Say they
were after Ray and the other people.
Q. What, if anything, did you do at that time?
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However, on cross-examination, Wormley testified that he first
met Taylor "about four months ago."'5 6 Wormley also "rather dra-
matically contradicted defense counsel's representations to the trial
court" 57 by stating that he had been visited at home by defense
counsel, five days before trial began.58
The trial judge excluded Wormley's testimony, explaining the ex-
clusion as a sanction for blatant, willful violation of Rule 413.5° The
judge also expressed his vexation that "defense attorneys have been
violating discovery in this courtroom in the last three or four cases
blatantly and I am going to put a stop to it and this is one way to do
SO. 9
60
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction, rejecting
an argument that preclusion of Wormley was an abuse of discre-
tion.6' The Illinois Supreme Court denied rehearing and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.62
A. At that time I left. I was on my way home and I happened to run into Ray
and them and so I told them what was happening and to watch out because
they got weapons.
Id. at 650, n.8.
56. Id. at 650.
57. Id.
58. Id. Defense counsel actually served Wormley with a subpoena during the
visit. Id. at 664 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 650. The judge explained:
THE COURT: Further, for whatever value it is, because this is a jury trial, I
have a great deal of doubt in my mind as to the veracity of this young man
that testified as to whether he was an eyewitness on the scene, sees guns that
are wrapped up. He doesn't know Ray but he stops Ray.
At any rate, Mr. Wormley is not going to testify, be a witness in this
courtroom.
Id.
60. Id. at 650-51.
61. People v. Taylor, 141 IlI. App. 3d 839, 491 N.E.2d 3 (1986). The Appellate
Court stated:
We find unpersuasive defendant's argument that his counsel was justified in
violating the discovery rules. The testimony of Wormely establishes that coun-
sel had spoken with him, knew his identity and served him with a subpoena
prior to trial. Yet counsel failed to list him as a witness. Defense counsel had
the opportunity to list the names of witnesses in his answer to discovery and, if
necessary, indicate that their addresses were unknown. We, therefore, believe
the trial court was within its discretion in refusing to allow the additional wit-
nesses to testify.
Id. at 845, 491 N.E.2d at 7.
The Appellate Court also rejected Taylor's claim of denial of effective assistance of
counsel, stating: "The record as a whole reveals that defense counsel represented defend-
ant sufficiently ably to preclude a finding of incompetency." Id. at 847, 491 N.E. 2d at 7.
62. Taylor v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 947 (1987).
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B. The Supreme Court Decision
After brushing aside a jurisdictional question, 3 the Court rejected
as "extreme and ...unacceptable" ' 4 arguments that compulsory
process entails either an absolute bar to the preclusion of a criminal
defense witness for any reason, or merely the bare subpoena power
devoid of a concomitant right to the testimony of summoned wit-
nesses. The Court quoted the key passage from Washington v.
Texas, 5 to explain that compulsory process is more than a simple
subpoena power.66 On the obverse proposition, that compulsory pro-
cess always bars preclusion of a defense witness, the Court observed
that the right to present testimony is clearly limited by the rules of
evidence.
7
In order to mediate these extreme positions, the Court looked to
what it considered the common rationale of compulsory process and
the exclusionary rules of evidence, i.e., the need to protect the integ-
rity of the adversary system of adjudication:
The principle that undergrids the defendant's right to present exculpatory
evidence is also the source of essential limitations on the right. The adver-
sary process could not function effectively without adherance to rules of
procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments
... .The State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is suffi-
cient to justify the imposition and enforcement of firm, though not always
inflexible, rules . . . .Discovery .. .minimizes the risk that a judgment
will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated
63. Justice Stevens relegated to a footnote the State's contention that Taylor
waived his sixth amendment claim by failing to present it adequately in the state court.
Stevens noted that although Taylor expressly asserted only a due process violation, his
reliance on an Illinois case that was based on Supreme Court compulsory process prece-
dents "[made] it appropriate to conclude that the [sixth amendment] constitutional ques-
tion was sufficiently well presented to the state courts to support our jurisdiction." Tay-
lor, 108 S. Ct. at 651 n.9.
On the other hand, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, felt "constrained to conclude that
...the Appellate Court of Illinois deemed the constitutional claims waived as a matter
of Illinois law." Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, Brennan pointed out that
even if Taylor's sixth amendment claims had been waived as a matter of state law, they
were not necessarily waived as a matter of federal law. Under the doctrine of Williams v.
Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1955), where a state court has the authority to, but fails
to exercise its power to disregard a procedural shortcoming in constitutional claims, the
Supreme Court can review the constitutional issues in spite of the state court waiver. Id.
64. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 653.
65. Id. at 651. See supra text accompanying note 15.
66. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 651.
67. The Court mentioned incompetent and privileged testimony as examples. Id.
at 653. Obviously, preclusion of witnesses under the rules of evidence is the daily work of
trial judges. The question here involves the preclusion of probative and material testi-
mony that would be admissible under the law of evidence.
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testimony.68
As an example of the State's interest in the orderly conduct of a
criminal trial surmounting the sixth amendment right to present a
defense, the Court advanced United States v. Nobles.69 In Nobles,
the Court approved a trial judge's refusal to allow the testimony of
the defense's investigator, absent disclosure by the defense of the in-
vestigator's complete report. Quoting a long passage from Nobles,
the Court emphasized the following sentence: "The Sixth Amend-
ment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the
legitimate demands of the adversarial system; one cannot invoke the
Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have
been a half-truth. ' 0
Having examined the sixth amendment precedents, the Court con-
sidered the argument that the availability of sanctions other than
preclusion makes preclusion "so drastic that it should never be im-
posed. 17 ' The Court acknowledged the availability of other methods
for dealing with the problems created by eleventh-hour witnesses: a
continuance or mistrial, which could alleviate the credibility problem
by allowing the State time to investigate, or disciplinary sanctions
against the defendant or defense counsel, as a deterrent against fu-
ture violations of the discovery rules.7 2 However, the Court dis-
counted the necessity of resorting to alternative sanctions:
It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate
in most cases, but it is equally clear that they would be less effective than
the preclusion sanction and that there are instances in which they would
perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the
adversary process.
73
For example, a contempt sanction would be ineffective against a
defendant facing a long jail term. Moreover, a desperate defendant
"can mislead an honest attorney. ' 74 Therefore, "[i]f a pattern of dis-
covery violations is explicable only on the assumption that the viola-
tions were designed to conceal a plan to present fabricated testi-
mony, it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted
evidence regardless of whether other sanctions would also be
merited." 5
The Court concluded its exposition on illicitly motivated discovery
68. Id. at 653-54.
69. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
70. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 654 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Nobles, 422 U.S. at
241).
71. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 654.
72. Id. at 655. The Court omits the prosecutorial comment as an alternative sanc-
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violations by declining to advance instructions as to all the circum-
stances under which exclusion would be appropriate. Rather, Justice
Stevens stated that tension between the right to present a defense
and the State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial
should be resolved as a question of balance within the discretion of
the trial court.
[A] trial court may not ignore the fundamental character of the defendant's
right to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor. But the mere invoca-
tion of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh counter-
vailing public interests. The integrity of the adversary process, which de-
pends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of
unreliable evidence; the interest in the fair and efficient administration of
justice; and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the
trial process must also weigh in the balance.7 6
After articulating these general statements, Justice Stevens moved
on to the more specific facts in Taylor. Taylor argued that preclu-
sion was unnecessarily harsh because the voir dire examination of
Wormley eliminated any danger of prejudice to the prosecution from
surprise, and that it was unfair to penalize him for defense counsel's
violation of the rules. 7
Justice Stevens rejected the first argument because prejudice to
the prosecution was not the only factor supporting the preclusion
sanction. The majority felt that preclusion was appropriate because
of the willful misconduct of the defendant's attorney. 8
The defendant's second argument was rejected as a strike "at the
heart of the attorney-client relationship.""9 Also, Justice Stevens saw
ethics problems in determining whether the client was an accomplice
in the discovery violation. Moreover, a client is ordinarily bound to
the consequences of his or her attorney's decisions during trial, and
there is no reason why the circumstances leading to preclusion
should warrant any different treatment. In conclusion, Justice Ste-
vens proposed that "[w]henever a lawyer makes use of the sword
76. Id.
77. Id. at 656.
78. Id. at 656-57.
We are also concerned with the impact of this kind of conduct on the integrity
of the judicial process itself. . . . [T]he discovery violation . . . was both will-
ful and blatant. Regardless of whether prejudice to the prosecution could have
been avoided . . . it is plain that the case fits into the category of willful
misconduct in which the most severe sanction is appropriate. After all, the
court, as well as the prosecutor, has a vital interest in protecting the trial pro-
cess from the pollution of perjured testimony.
Id.
79. Id. at 657.
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provided by the Compulsory Process Clause, there is some risk that
he may wound his own client."80
C. The Supreme Court Dissent
Justice Brennan argued that witness preclusion is an "arbitrary
and disproportionate penalty."81 He believed that alternative sanc-
tions could correct the harm to the truth-seeking process and deter
future violations8 2 better than preclusion, which "distorts the truth-
seeking process by excluding material evidence ... 83 Justice
Brennan, also troubled by preclusion where there is no evidence of
complicity in the violation by the defendant, 84 "would [have held]
that, absent evidence of the defendant's personal involvement in a
discovery violation, the Compulsory Process Clause per se [barred]
discovery sanctions that exclude criminal defense evidence."8
Brennan agreed with the majority that compulsory process is not
an absolute right. He relied on the same passage from Washington v.
Texas as the majority, 6 and then acknowledged that compulsory
process "does not invalidate every restriction on the presentation of
evidence." 87 However, he argued that the proper method to evaluate
the constitutional question here was through the standard of Rock v.
Arkansas,"" which guarded against arbitrary or disproportionate re-
striction of a defendant's right to testify.
In Justice Brennan's view, the evidentiary purpose of discovery
rules is best achieved by granting continuances or allowing
prosecutorial comment on the nature of discovery and the existence
of a violation.89 The deterrent function is best achieved by direct
sanctions against defense counsel. 0 These methods are superior to
preclusion because they do not offend the fundamental right to pre-
80. Id.
81. Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 664.
83. Id. at 658.
84. Id. at 664.
85. Id. at 658.
86. Id. at 660.
87. Id.
88. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). See supra text accompanying note 24.
89. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 664-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 665. Brennan observed that the language of Rule 415 required that
disclosure be made by "defense counsel." Id. Other discovery rules require the "defend-
ant" to make disclosure. See, e.g., Aiz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(c); MASS. R. CRUM. P.
14(b)(1)(A). In one case reversing a trial judge's preclusion decision, an imaginative
judge, estimating the daily cost of the Superior Court at $1,583 and defendant's discov-
ery violation at one-half day of court time, suggested that an appropriate sanction would
be to assess the errant counsel an amount equal to the value of the delay that he had
caused. See Chappee v. Commonwealth of Mass., 659 F. Supp. 1220, 1226-28 nn. 9, 10
(D. Mass. 1987).
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sent a defense and they do not distort the truth as does preclusion.9"
These considerations indicate that preclusion violates the Rock v.
Arkansas prohibition against arbitrary and disproportionate restric-
tions on the right to present a defense.92
Justice Brennan went on to state that "[t]he arbitrary and dispro-
portionate nature of the preclusion sanction is highlighted where the
penalty falls on the defendant even though he bore no responsibility
for the discovery violation. 93 Moreover, the record indicates that the
trial judge excluded Wormley's testimony not only for the instant
discovery violation, but also in response to violations by other attor-
neys in other cases. 94 Brennan argued that this was an "improper
basis"9 for preclusion and that the majority had not adequately ad-
dressed the issue. In regard to the majority's position that the client
must accept the consequences of the attorney's trial management,
Justice Brennan averred that "[t]he rationales for binding defend-
ants to attorneys' routine tactical errors do not apply to attorney
misconduct. An attorney is never faced with a legitimate choice that
includes misconduct as an option." 96
91. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. As Justice Brennan explained:
The central point to keep in mind is that witness preclusion operates as an
effective deterrent only to the extent that it has a possible effect on the out-
come of the trial. Indeed, it employs in part the possibility that a distorted
record will cause a jury to convict a defendant of a crime he did not commit.
Witness preclusion thus punishes discovery violations in a way that is both
dispproportionate - it might result in a defendant charged with a capital of-
fense being convicted and receiving a death sentence he would not have re-
ceived but for the discovery violation - and arbitrary - it might, in another
case involving an identical discovery violation, result in a defendant suffering
no change in verdict or, if charged with a lesser offense, being convicted and
receiving a light or suspended sentence. In contrast, direct punitive measures
(such as contempt sanctions or, if the attorney is responsible, disciplinary pro-




94. Id. at 650.
95. Id. at 664-65.
96. Id. at 666. Justice Brennan draws a distinction between tactical decisions and
misconduct. A tactical decision is whether to introduce evidence at a certain point in the
trial. Failure to comply with a discovery rule is misconduct. Id. at 665-66. However,
willful failure to comply with the discovery rule can also be viewed as a tactical decision
reached by weighing the danger of preclusion against the value of insulating a witness
from the prosecution's investigatory power.
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III. ANALYSIS
Taylor upholds the Illinois rule both on its face and as applied.
The first holding is entirely sound; the qualified nature of the dis-
senting opinion suggests that the Court could unanimously approve
exercise of the preclusion sanction where an accused instigated a dis-
covery violation. 7
The second holding is the divisive issue in Taylor. Although pre-
clusion may be sound where the defendant personally withheld dis-
covery, preclusion where the defendant was not involved provokes a
sense of fundamental unfairness. Because the record in Taylor shows
no rule-breaking by the defendant, it seems that there would be no
case in which the court would recognize unfairness in exercise of the
preclusion sanction.
Nevertheless, situations are conceivable in which bona fide reasons
exist for failure to identify a witness during discovery. An obvious
example is when an honest witness actually is found or comes forth
immediately prior to or during trial. Preclusion of such a witness
would clearly distort the truth-seeking process and upend the quest
for fairness in the trial process. Any omniscient observer must be
offended. Yet, a trial judge is not all-knowing, and thus, with acu-
men sufficient to withstand voir dire cross-examination, may dis-
credit the witness (and proponent counsel) as a mere perjurer.
The Court's refusal to emphasize, let alone insist on, less drastic
means of testing witness veracity allows unjust and counter-produc-
tive preclusion. In effect, the Court has created a rule of evidence -
a presumption that witnesses not named in discovery are untrustwor-
thy. Notions of fundamental fairness demand, of course, that the
presumption be rebuttable. Rebuttal, however, poses profound diffi-
culties. At a minimum, the proponent is called on to prove a nega-
tive, that is, lack of prior contact witlb the undisclosed witness. Re-
buttal would also entail convincing the trial judge of the witness'
truthfulness.
This second factor is the most troubling aspect of witness preclu-
sion. Resort to the sanction substitutes a trial judge's estimate of a
witness's veracity for that of a jury. Though judges routinely must
determine whether proffered testimony is incompetent, privileged, or
unduly prejudicial, evaluation of veracity should be solely within the
jury's purview.
To many, judicial preclusion of discredited eleventh-hour witnesses
will not seem egregious. In that sense, Taylor was an easy case; the
State's voir dire cross-examination of Wormley severely disparaged
97. In such circumstances, preclusion protects the adversary system analogously
to preclusion where the accused violated the sequestration of intended witnesses. See J.
WIGMORE, 6 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1842 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1976).
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his testimony. But in a harder case, where voir dire does not or can-
not reveal any lack of credibility, preclusion can only hinder the
truth-seeking process by keeping from the jury relevant, probative
evidence. A linchpin of the adversary system reserves evaluation of
conflicting testimony for the jury.98 Considering how difficult rebut-
tal of the presumption would be, a better view of compulsory process
would require review of the feasibility of sanctions other than
preclusion.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged that alternative sanctions "may
well be . . .appropriate in most cases. . . ."99 Taylor, implied the
Court, was not like most cases. The transparent "plan to present
fabricated testimony"' 00 foreclosed any need for a sanction other
than preclusion. That leaves an open question whether an 'appropri-
ate' sanction is required in 'most cases.'
The Court's balancing formula sheds no light on the question. The
listed factors cut both ways as to granting a continuance, which
would be the likely response to surprise witnesses if preclusion were
available only as a last resort in most cases. First, the Court spoke to
the rejection of unreliable evidence, which seems to require a recess
to enable the prosecution to depose and investigate the eleventh-hour
witness.' 0' The third listed factor, concerning possible prejudice to
the prosecution, argues against a recess because the jury's attention
would focus on the surprise witness as their recollection of the state's
witnesses faded.
The Court's other criterion seems less an element in a balancing
test than a platitude and splits internally on the question whether
compulsory process requires a continuance in the absence of an obvi-
ous plan for perjury. We are told that a trial judge must consider
"the fair and efficient administration of justice."' 0 2 If efficient ad-
ministration of justice means speedy disposition of cases, then con-
98. Even if an undisclosed witness substantially loses credibility during voir dire
cross-examination, it is more consonant with compulsory process to permit the testimony
subject to impeachment for prior inconsistent statements than to simply preclude the
witness. Moreover, counsel whose witness has been destroyed during voir dire would be
more likely to withdraw the witness rather than prejudice the rest of the case by present-
ing easily impeached testimony. Thus, the end result would be the same as if the judge
had precluded the witness, without any infringement on compulsory process rights.
99. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655.
100. Id.
101. This analysis assumes that veracity judgments are reserved for the jury rather
than the trial judge. A recess would enable the prosecution to plan its cross-examination
strategy.
102. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655.
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tinuance should not be required. On the other hand, if fair adminis-
tration of justice means presentation of all relevant, probative and
not demonstrably perjurious testimony, then continuance should be
required. Thus, the holding in Taylor that compulsory process does
not absolutely bar preclusion provides little guidance for trial court
procedure where a defendant can make a prima facie showing that a
surprise witness is not unreliable. In other words, would compulsory
process require a continuance if Wormley had not been impeached
during voir dire cross-examination?
The Court's work in Taylor extends to all witnesses the presump-
tion from Williams that undisclosed alibi witnesses are unreliable.
Extending the presumption to all witnesses includes extension to the
defendant, which is problematic and anachronistic.
The Florida rule approved in Williams required notice only of al-
ibi witnesses, and excepted the accused. The Illinois rule approved in
Taylor, however, requires notice of all witnesses and makes no ex-
ception for the defendant. The Court in Taylor does not discuss
these distinctions. 03 Thus, under Taylor, an accused who had ini-
tially decided to remain silent at trial, but reconsidered as the trial
progressed, could be precluded from testifying.
A trial judge who precluded an accused from testifying based on
the reasoning of Taylor, that an undisclosed witness is presumptively
untrustworthy, would be reverting to ideas that became obsolete in
the 19th century. The old idea, extant when the Bill of Rights was
framed, was that a criminal defendant was disqualified from testify-
ing because of his interest in the outcome.10 4 Through the evolution
of law that idea was discarded.
In 1961, in Ferguson v. Georgia,10 5 the Court outlined the historic
development of a defendant's right to testify, observing that
"[d]isqualification for interest was. . . extensive in the common law
when this Nation was formed."106 The old view was discarded be-
cause the Court read into the fourteenth amendment a defendant's
"right to have his counsel question him to elicit his statement."10 7
Considering Ferguson in Rock v. Arkansas, the Court wrote that
"[there is no justification today for a rule that denies an accused
103. In a paragraph-long separate dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that his agree-
ment with Justice Brennan's dissent was limited to general reciprocal discovery rules.
Justice Blackmun's view is that the state's interest in a notice-of-alibi rule "might well
occasion a result different from what should obtain in the factual context of the present
case." Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 667-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. See Bradley, supra note 15 at 420-21.
105. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
106. Id. at 574 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 596. Although the opinion did not expressly recognize a defendant's
right to testify, two concurring Justices suggested the right, and the case has been read
for that suggestion. See Bradley, supra note 15 at 421.
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the opportunity to offer his own testimony. Like the truthfulness of
other witnesses, the defendant's veracity, which was the concern be-
hind the original common law rule, can be tested adequately by
cross-examination.' ' 8
Thus, precluding the testimony of a defendant because of a failure
to give pre-trial notice certainly repudiates Rock and suggests a re-
turn to discredited common law rationales. In a post-Taylor case,
the accused was allowed to testify, but was not permitted to speak
about an alibi because he had not given the required pre-trial no-
tice. 09 The court discussed Taylor with approval. If such preclusion
will be the result of Taylor, then Taylor was wrongly decided.
Restricting in part or in whole the testimony of a defendant who
decided to testify only after the trial had begun demonstrates the
folly of the preclusion sanction. After all, the prosecution must prove
its case; to argue that preclusion prevents prejudice to the state sim-
ply misconceives the allocation of the burden of proof in a criminal
trial.1 0 To prevent a defendant from testifying, "I did not commit
the crime with which I am charged" or "I was alone in my car driv-
ing around town when this crime took place" overlooks the burden of
proof placed on the prosecution."'
Generally, if anyone would commit perjury, it would most likely
be the accused. If the law has rejected a presumption that defend-
ants are not credible in favor of jury evaluation of a defendant's tes-
timony, then surely a presumption that other, less directly motivated
witnesses are not trustworthy is unsound, discovery violation not-
withstanding. Moreover, whatever merit there may be in such a pre-
sumption should be extinguished by the constitutional guarantee of
108. 107 S. Ct. at 2709.
109. See State v. Gonzalez, 223 N.J. Super. 377, 538 A.2d 1261 (1988).
110. This point is discussed in Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 924 (7th Cir.
1982) ("As an essential part of its case, the state must prove a defendant's presence
during the commission of an alleged crime, proof which invariably requires pretrial inves-
tigation and preparation .... [T]he state is in a formidable position to refute a defend-
ant's unexpected alibi testimony, particularly where ... such testimony is uncorrobo-
rated by other defense witnesses. We doubt that a defendant's unsupported explanation
will overcome testimony by state witnesses placing him at the scene of the crime.").
11l. This is not to suggest that a defendant is entitled to testify falsely, because it
is "crystal clear that there is no right whatever--constitutional or otherwise-for a de-
fendant to use false evidence." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986). Rather, the
idea is that because the burden of proof is on the prosecution, it makes little sense to
condition a defendant's right to present uncorroborated testimony on compliance with a
notice rule. By extension, it also is unnecessary to condition the defendant's right to
present other eyewitness testimony as a method of 'protecting' the adversary system. Ad-
versity is built into the trial by placing the burden of proof on the state.
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compulsory process as defined in Washington v. Texas.
Taylor certainly stands to make the criminal trial more efficient, if
efficiency is measured by speed rather than accuracy. By neither em-
phasizing nor insisting on less drastic means analysis, the Court al-
lows preclusion without requiring a recess for investigation of the
surprise witness. Though efficiency is a desirable goal, it is in tension
with fairness; thus, our courts are adversarial, not inquisitorial. In-
creasing efficiency at the expense of fairness is not laudable.
The provisions of the sixth amendment are guarantees of fairness
in the criminal trial. Conversely, there are no constitutional guaran-
tees of efficiency. One wonders how the Court can elevate efficiency
to constitutional stature sufficient to overcome the requirements of
the Compulsory Process Clause. The answer is found, perhaps, in the
following passage, which in the Taylor opinion immediately follows
the Court's balancing test:
A trial judge may certainly insist on an explanation for a party's failure to
comply with a request to identify his or her witnesses in advance of trial. If
that explanation reveals that the omission was willful and motivated by a
desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness
of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, it would
be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Confrontation Clause simply
to exclude the witness' testimony.'
1 2
The Court's meaning is unclear. Considering that the constitu-
tional discussion in the opinion is otherwise devoted to the Compul-
sory Process Clause, it is strange to see mentioned, and without the
customary footnote, the Confrontation Clause." 3 This clause, like
the Compulsory Process Clause, a component of the sixth amend-
ment, guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . . "114
This confusion of clauses could simply be a mistake. The passage
reads better with "Compulsory Process Clause" in place of "Con-
frontation Clause." If the words are correct as printed in the interim
edition Supreme Court Reporter, then the Court in a strange rever-
sal seems to bestow on the prosecution the benefit of the Confronta-
tion Clause. Yet, by the plain words of the sixth amendment, the
benefit of the Confrontation Clause belongs to the accused; the state
must protect itself by means other than that constitutional language.
This the state has done by enacting the discovery rule. As taught
in Williams, the rule itself is sound."n However, there seems little
merit in approving the preclusion sanction as a means of enforcing
discovery rules, as against compulsory process, by implying the exis-
1132
112. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655-56 (footnote omitted).
113. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
114. Id.
115. Discovery is sound only if reciprocal. See supra note 6.
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tence of some right in the state analogous to the Confrontation
Clause. One can only hope that trial judges faced with discovery vio-
lations will place more weight on the side of the balance that the
Court labeled "the fundamental character of the defendant's right to
offer the testimony of witnesses" 116 than did the Court in Taylor.
Fortunately, the opinion leaves much leeway for the lower courts.
Indeed, it appears that the useful teaching in Taylor is only the sim-
ple fact that compulsory process does not absolutely bar the preclu-
sion sanction. This fact, which the dissent does not seriously contest,
implies that under some circumstances compulsory process does bar
the preclusion sanction.
The Court seemed content to allow the lower courts autonomy in
dealing with the preclusion sanction, as long as no courts hold that
preclusion is absolutely barred by compulsory process. This deferen-
tial approach is evident in the Court's statement that "it is neither
necessary nor appropriate for us to attempt to draft a comprehensive
set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in every possible
case." 117 Immediately after that statement, the Court expounded its
balancing text. Then, Justice Stevens undercut the generally severe
tone of his dicta by choosing, as an example of balancing the com-
peting interests, an opinion that is antithetical to the language in
Taylor.
In a footnote to his balancing test, Justice Stevens signaled Fend-
ler v. Goldsmith"" as an example of a balancing approach applied.
This is a surprising citation, because the tenor of Fendler is opposite
to that of Taylor. Where Taylor downplays the accused's interests,
Fendler emphasizes them. For example: first, Justice Stevens in Tay-
lor stated that compulsory process will not adhere to "presumptively
perjured testimony," 119 whereas the 9th Circuit in Fendler "empha-
size[d] that for a balancing test to meet Sixth Amendment stan-
dards, it must begin with a presumption against exclusion of other-
wise admissible defense evidence." 20 Second, the balancing test in
Taylor omitted what is deemed in Fendler "the most significant fac-
116. See supra text accompanying note 76.
117. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 655.
118. 728 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1983). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Fendler
determined that the proper approach to the constitutional issues in defense witness pre-
clusion was either a fiat prohibition on preclusion or a balancing test. The court expressly
refused to adopt either approach, but proceeded to resolve the case by balancing the
accused's sixth amendment rights against the state interest in efficient administration of
justice. Id. at 1188.
119. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 656.
120. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1188.
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tor: how important was the witness?" 121 Third, where Taylor em-
phasized the "State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal
trial" '122 and the "efficient administration of justice,' '1 23 Fendler
averred that "[a]ny state interest . ..could have been accommo-
dated by a brief continuance."1 24 That these cases are diametrically
opposed in tone is illustrated by this summary paragraph in Fendler:
We assume that the failure to comply with the discovery orders was willful.
We need not decide whether the willfulness was attributable to Fendler per-
sonally. The determinative factor here is that Fendler was deprived of the
testimony of a witness who was important to his defense on a material issue.
That is too high a price to exact for failure to comply with discovery orders
issued pursuant to general discovery rules. We find that . . Fendler's sixth
amendment rights were violated by the witness preclusion order. 12 5
Signaling Fendler as an example makes Taylor so equivocal as to
render it useless as guiding precedent. An appellate court reviewing
a trial judge's decision to preclude a witness could, if it were so in-
clined, affirm the preclusion by relying on any of the dicta in Taylor.
Another appellate court, on the same facts, could reverse the preclu-
sion by relying on the Fendler footnote.
Only one exception to the ambivalence of Taylor appears. In con-
trast to the facts in Taylor, where the precluded witness was a com-
plete surprise at trial, in Fendler the defense had named the pre-
cluded witness in advance of trial, but violated the rules by
repeatedly refusing to supply the prosecution with an address for the
witness. 26 This factual difference suggests weakly that surprise may
be the determinative factor. The suggestion is weak, because the del-
eterious effects of surprise could have been eliminated in Taylor by a
continuance, which the 9th Circuit in Fendler considered to be a
preferable alternative to preclusion.
A better idea is that the use of Fendler indicates Justice Stevens'
individual attitude on the attorney's conduct in Taylor. Justice Ste-
vens joined the majority in Rock v. Arkansas, so apparently he is not
loath to the Court's invalidating a state rule of evidence. Moreover,
Justice Stevens frequently is the fourth member of the dissent in
cases narrowing the constitutional rights of criminal defendants,
joining the three Justices who dissented in Taylor. Perhaps Justice
Stevens, trying to support compulsory process yet appalled by the
121. Id.
122. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 653.
123. Id. at 655.
124. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1189-90 (footnote omitted). Moreover, Fendler argues
that "there is every reason to believe that a preclusion order is no more effective than
other available sanctions." Id. at 1186. This stands in sharp contrast to the Court's words
that other sanctions "would be less effective than the preclusion sanction .... " Supra
text accompanying note 73.
125. Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1190 (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 1183.
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fabrication of testimony, used Fendler to indicate to lower courts
that preclusion should be used only sparingly. The failure to insist on
less drastic means is simply traditional deference to trial judge dis-
cretion, mitigated by Fendler, which is about as close as possible to a
requirement of less drastic means without actually insisting on it.
On balance, the equivocation in Taylor makes Justice Brennan's
dissent more persuasive than Justice Stevens' majority opinion.
Where the majority opinion is filled with indignant generalizations,
the dissent carefully shows that witness preclusion is not only more
likely to distort the truth and less likely to deter future violations,
but is also unnecessary and simply unfair to an accused who has not
participated in the discovery violation. To conclude, it seems appro-
priate to repeat Justice Brennan's eloquent final paragraph:
Discovery rules are important, but only as a means for helping the criminal
system convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. Precluding defense wit-
ness testimony as a sanction for a defense counsel's willful discovery viola-
tion not only directly subverts criminal justice by basing convictions on a
partial presentation of the facts . . . but is also arbitrary and disproportion-
ate to any of the purposes served by discovery rules or discovery sanctions.
The Court today thus sacrifices the paramount values of the criminal sys-
tem in a misguided and unnecessary effort to preserve the sanctity of dis-
covery. We may never know for certain whether the defendant or Bridges'
brother fired the shot for which the defendant was convicted. We do know,
however, that the jury that convicted the defendant was not permitted to
hear evidence that would have both placed a gun in Bridges' brother's
hands and contradicted the testimony of Bridges and his brother that they
possessed no weapons that evening - and that, because of the defense
counsel's five day delay in identifying a witness, an innocent man may be
serving ten years in prison. I dissent.'21 7
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to tackle the constitutional
questions raised by preclusion of criminal defense witnesses as a
sanction for discovery violations. Now that the Court has finally ad-
dressed the issue, the law remains unchanged. The holding in Taylor
that compulsory process does not absolutely bar the preclusion sanc-
tion will have limited impact, because few courts have held to the
contrary. The Court's holding could be restated, that under some
circumstances compulsory process bars the preclusion sanction. The
127. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Court's equivocation provides little guidance to the lower courts for
determining what those circumstances are.
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